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Abstract
This article considers the evolution of governance standards for determining the extent of an enterprise’s responsibilities to protect human rights in weak governance
zones. The article briefly describes the development of the standard and then evaluates the standard as it has been developed and framed within the U.N. Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights and in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD
Guidelines). Particular attention will be paid to the Risk Awareness Tool for Multinational Enterprises which was developed to complement the OECD Guidelines following the call made by 2005 G8 Summit for the development of OECD guidance.
The article suggests the ways that CSR has been transformed, in some respects, to a
mandate for assuming governance responsibilities in those states unable or unwilling
to institute systems of law that conform to international consensus standards on human rights. It also explores the challenges of the approaches of both efforts. Both
acknowledge the autonomy of enterprises as directly responsible for the operationalization of international norms wherever they operate. Yet both also open the door to
extraterritorial application of law. The same framework that advances the governance autonomy of enterprises also envisions them as the vehicles through which home
states may project national power within host states with weak governance regimes.
Or it may be understood as an important vehicle for internationalizing the law of
states characterized by weak governance. In this respect the weak governance zone
principles parallels, on the private side, the efforts at legal internationalization general to many bilateral investment treaties. And this tension built into both frameworks, a tension that goes to the dual character of enterprises as both autonomous
governance actors and as creatures of the states in which they are domiciled, that
mark the potential and the challenge to the internationalization of regimes of CSR.
Multinational corporations (MNEs) operate in virtually every part of the world.1
Their global operations are subject to a variety of rules. This is especially the case in
matters touching on emerging global norms for corporate responsibility respecting
social, cultural, environmental and human rights.2 The principal conventional obligation of MNEs is to obey the laws of the jurisdictions in which they operate, or
which may otherwise assert authority or some aspect of their operations. This obli-

1.
2.
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E.g., JOHN G. RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
(2013). For a more critical view, see also, RICHARD FALK, PREDATORY GLOBALIZATION: A
CRITIQUE (1999).
E.g., JENNIFER A. ZERK, MULTINATIONALS AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY:
LIMITATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006); accord SURYA DEVA,
REGULATING CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: HUMANIZING BUSINESS (2012).
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gation poses no particular issue where the state and its institutions are well developed. That is so even where there may be substantial differences between the law of
the home states of MNEs and those of its host states. But legal compliance becomes
more challenging in weak governance zones, those jurisdictions, ostensibly states,
whose governments are unable or unwilling to assume their responsibilities.3 “Characteristics of such zones are likely to include areas of conflict and areas where serious violations of international human rights occur, often in the absence of accountability and with a broad failure of the rule of law.”4
These weak governance zones represent some of the most challenging environments in which enterprises can operate.
In his 2006 report, the Special Representative surveyed allegations
of the worst cases of corporate-related human rights harm. They
occurred, predictably, where governance challenges were greatest:
disproportionately in low income countries; in countries that often
had just emerged from or still were in conflict; and in countries
where the rule of law was weak and levels of corruption high. A
significant fraction of the allegations involved companies being
complicit in the acts of governments or armed factions.5
Traditionally, enterprises had little guidance. For many enterprises, that meant
operating in a law free zone.6 In such circumstances enterprises would sometimes

3.

4.

5.
6.

See OECD, Investments in Weak Governance Zones: Summary of Consultations (Sept. 2015)
(“These “government failures” lead to broader failures in political, economic and civic institutions
that the OECD Investment Committee refers to as “weak governance”.”” Id., 1), available
http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/35397593.pdf; see also Susan Rose Ackerman, Governance and
Corruption, in GLOBAL CRISES, GLOBAL SOLUTIONS 301-44 (Bjorn Lomborg, 2004).
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF EMPLOYERS, BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF
BUSINESS IN WEAK GOVERNANCE ZONES: BUSINESS PROPOSALS FOR EFFECTIVE WAYS OF
ADDRESSING DILEMMA SITUATIONS IN WEAK GOVERNANCE ZONES (2006), http://www.reports-andmaterials.org/sites/default/files/reports-and-materials/Role-of-Business-in-Weak-GovernanceZones-Dec-2006.pdf [hereinafter THE ROLE OF BUSINESS IN WEAK GOVERNANCE ZONES].
John G. Ruggie, Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights,
INNOVATIONS: TECHNOLOGY, GOVERNANCE, GLOBALIZATION 189, 190 (2008), available at
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/itgg.2008.3.2.189.
The notion of a law free zone ought to be understood in a peculiar sense, not that corporations
have no responsibility to comply with law, rather that they have no enforceable legal obligation
to do so. Ursula Wynhoven, then of the United Nations Global Compact explained: “Regardless
of whether governments are meeting their own duties, corporations must respect human rights;
they don’t operate in a law-free zone. However, they don’t have a legal responsibility to do so.
That’s the difficulty of holding companies accountable under international law and through
international channels.” Danielle Marie Mackey, In a world of borderless business, who may
enforce human rights? LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE (July 2014), http://mondediplo.com/blogs/ina-world-of-borderless-business-who-may-enforce. See also, John F. Sherman III, The UN
Guiding Principles for the Corporate Legal Advisor: Corporate Governance, Risk Management,
and Professional Responsibility (April 4, 2012), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/human_rights/sherman_legal_advisors_paper.authcheckdam.pdf
(“however,
this business responsibility does not exist in a law free zone . . .”).
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serve as the only source of regulatory authority within those areas in which they
operated and with respect to those people with which they interacted. And sometimes they might find themselves, perhaps out of necessity, as complicit, directly or
indirectly, in the human rights wrongs committed within the territories in which
they operated. The problem was acute in areas of violent conflict and widespread
human rights abuses, particularly in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South
Sudan and Angola at the start of the 21st century.
Business has been leery of any substantial public role, noting early in the process
of the genesis of the creation of what was to become the United Nations Guiding
Principles of Business and Human Rights (UNGP)7 that their role “also requires
recognition of the legal and practical limitations faced by any non-state actor.”8 For
business that means nothing more than “to obey the law, even if it is not enforced,
and to respect the principles of relevant international instruments where national
law is absent.”9 Yet, over the course of the last decade, global actors have been moving toward a rough consensus around the notions of the extent of the responsibilities
of business in global governance touching on economic, social, cultural and sometimes political rights among those touched by their activities.10 More specifically,
international actors and influential civil society elements have come to understand
that enterprises operating in weak governance zones, especially in violent conflict
areas, may have responsibilities of a kind quite distinct from a mere duty to comply
with local law.11 For civil society, and increasingly, public international organiza-

7.

8.
9.
10.

11.
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UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON
BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: IMPLEMENTING THE UNITED NATIONS ‘PROTECT, RESPECT AND
REMEDY FRAMEWORK, (2011) available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/
GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf [hereinafter UNGP] (“The Special Representative annexed
the Guiding Principles to his final report to the Human Rights Council (A/HRC/17/31), which also
includes an introduction to the Guiding Principles and an overview of the process that led to their
development. The Human Rights Council endorsed the Guiding Principles in its resolution 17/4 of
16 June 2011.’) Id. at iv.
THE ROLE OF BUSINESS IN WEAK GOVERNANCE ZONES, supra note 4.
Id.
E.g., ZERK, supra note 2; John G. Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving
International Agenda, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 819 (2007); Andreas Georg Scherer, Guido Palazzo
and Dorothée Baumann, Global Rules and Private Actors: Toward a New Role of the
Transnational Corporation in Global Governance, 16 BUS. ETHICS QUARTERLY 505 (2015); Peter
Muchlinski, Implementing the New UN Corporate Human Rights Framework: Implications for
Corporate Law, Governance and Regulation, 22 BUS. ETHICS Q. 145 (2012).
E.g., Virginia Haufler, Governing Corporations in Zones of Conflict: Issues, Actors and
Institutions, in WHO GOVERNS THE GLOBE 102 (Deborah D. Avant, Martha Finnemore and
Susan K. Sell eds., 2010); Virginia Haufler, The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme: An
Innovation in Global Governance and Conflict Prevention, 89 J. BUS. ETHICS 403 (2009);
Mungbalemwe Koyame, United Nations Resolutions and the Struggle to Curb the Illicit Trade
in Conflict Diamonds in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1 AFR. J. LEGAL STUD. 80 (2005).
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tions, it might mean more than legal compliance, even in the absence of the apparatus of a law-state. Additionally, the corporate social responsibility (CSR) of business in that context might also extend beyond conventional CSR and acquires a more
compelling character.12 The notion arises from the embrace of the judgment that
such enterprises may inadvertently and indirectly help to provide both the means
and the motive for violence or might enable local human rights violations by providing revenues that are channeled through weak fiscal institutions. As a consequence,
the framework of transnational regulation of enterprises in such zones has embraced
the premise that enterprises ought to bear a responsibility to provide effective protection of the human rights of local populations and to ensure that their activities do
not enlarge conflict or serve to enhance or enable human rights violating conduct of
governments or of combatants in the area. Current efforts to establish governance
frameworks tend to try to mediate between a central role for enterprises grounded
on their public and societal13 obligations and a more peripheral role based on the
premise that enterprises have a secondary public role.
This article considers the evolution of governance standards for determining the
extent of enterprises’ responsibilities to protect human rights in weak governance
zones. Part I briefly describes the development of the OECD Risk Awareness Tool
for Multinational Enterprises in Weak Governance Zones (the “Risk Awareness
Tool”) standard14 and the UNGP for Business and Human Rights (and especially
around Principles 7 and 23) and in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD Guidelines).15 The
approaches of each are compared. Part II then considers some of the challenges of
each system and of both applied simultaneously through the OECD Guidelines. The
more significant of these issues are explored: (1) coherence and scope of coverage; (2)
issues of definition; (3) risk and complicity; (4) the perils of a heightened managerial
12.

13.

14.

15.

Critics have maintained that Enterprise engagement in business in conflict zones especially
may pose a threat to those areas by inhibiting the ability of lawful government to assert
authority. E.g., Ans Kolk and François Lenfant, Multinationals, CSR and Partnerships in
Central African Conflict Countries, 20 CORP. SOC. RESP. & ENVTL. MGMT. 43 (2013).
I use the term societal rather than social to distinguish the obligations from something that is
discretionary or optional, to something that may be compelled by the rule structures of the
systems within which enterprises operate—the governance systems of either enterprise selfconstitution, or those of the systemic rules within which the enterprise operates. See, e.g.,
Gunther Teubner, Self-Constitutionalizing TNCs? On the Linkage of "Private" and "Public"
Corporate Codes of Conduct, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 617 (2011).
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD RISK AWARENESS
TOOL FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES IN WEAK GOVERNANCE ZONES, (2006), available at
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/corporateresponsibility/36885821.pdf [hereinafter OECD RISK
AWARENESS TOOL].
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD GUIDELINES FOR
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 2011 EDITION, (2011), available at http://www.oecd.org/
corporate/mne/48004323.pdf [hereinafter OECD GUIDELINES].
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care standard; (5) legitimate and illegitimate political activities; (6) the projection of
the ideology of legal internationalization into the private sphere; and (7) enforcement and the role of the lawyer. The article suggests the ways that CSR has been
transformed, in some respects, from the expression of the social responsibility of enterprises to a mandate for assuming governance responsibilities in those states unable or unwilling to institute systems of law that conform to international consensus
standards on human rights. In that respect, weak governance zone principles contribute to both the legitimation of extraterritoriality16 as a justified principle of governance and also to the production of internationalized domestic law that has become an important part of public law through bilateral investment treaties.

I. The Regulatory Framework
The debate over the scope of the responsibilities of business enterprises in weak
governance zones arises in the context of a wider discussion about the societal obligations of enterprises.17 The issue of the extent of the societal obligations of enterprises, their public purpose, has been ongoing in developed states for almost a century.18 That discussion has been centered, in turn, on the issue of the scope of
stakeholders which corporations serve. One camp continues to hold that enterprises
are centers of private economic activity (either permitted to operate through law or
arising from the contractual arrangements among its stakeholders) which ought to
serve its key internal stakeholders, principally shareholders. A variant extends that
scope to the enterprise itself. In its most extreme form, this theory posits that the
extension of any public purpose to private enterprises is itself anti-democratic. Enterprises might engage in socially positive acts, but only to the extent that these
ultimately serve the interest of the enterprise in maximizing the welfare of its principal stakeholders. This view continues to serve as the bedrock of most modern approaches to the legal regulation of enterprises in developed states. Another camp
takes the opposite view. They tend to hold that enterprises—as creations of the state
and as recipients of substantial privileges by reason of their status as legal or juridical persons—ought to serve a public purpose. That purpose might be understood in
a number of ways. That purpose might include an obligation to consider the effects

16.

17.
18.
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Discussed in Daniel Augenstein & David Kinley, When Human Rights ‘Responsibilities’ become
‘Duties’: The Extra Territorial Obligations of states that Bind Corporations, in HUMAN RIGHTS
OBLIGATIONS OF BUSINESS: BEYOND THE CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TO RESPECT? 271 (Surya
Deva & David Bilchitz eds., 2013).
See, e.g., Rhys Jenkins, Globalization, Corporate Social Responsibility and Poverty, 81 INT’L
AFFAIRS 525 (2005).
See Larry Catá Backer, Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law: The United Nations’
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations as a Harbinger of Corporate Social
Responsibility in International Law, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 287 (2006).
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of corporate activity on a number of outside stakeholders—labor, local communities,
consumers and the like—even if that consideration reduces the ability of companies
to earn income for their shareholders or otherwise increase their wealth. As a consequence, enterprises are said to have a social responsibility beyond its bare legal
obligations, and sometimes despite them. And, indeed, corporate social responsibility as a legal and operational concept arises from an acceptance of the premise of
corporate purpose substantially broader than a purely internally driven economic
one. This view has found its greatest expression, not in national law, but in developing soft law frameworks at the international level and among civil society efforts
to develop corporate behavior norms under the umbrella of corporate social responsibility.
At its most extreme, the view that enterprises have societal duties suggests that
corporations have a direct obligation to ensure enforcement not merely of local law
but also of relevant international norms, and that this obligation produces legal consequences. At its limit, it might suggest that states might have obligations of a nature equivalent to that of states, and that consequently they may be liable to anyone
affected by their failures. The view that enterprises ought to have direct responsibility for the enforcement of law and norms through their operations, has not yet
gained a substantial enough following to be enacted in either national or international law. But the efforts leading to the failed Norms on Responsibilities of Transnational Enterprises19 suggests that there are enough powerful supporters of this
theory to keep it on the political horizon.20 In any of its forms, the view of the societal
responsibilities of enterprises has found substantial support within civil society organization and international public bodies. To some extent, and in less pronounced
form, it has also found some acceptance among enterprises, especially multinational
enterprises.
The embrace of the premise that enterprises do have a public responsibility has
driven not merely the CSR movement, as an expression of societally compelled (extra-legal in its narrowest sense) obligation, but also the construction, by private and
public organizations of rule systems for the articulation of CSR and its implementation. Indeed, though states have been reluctant to change their legislative approaches to impose societal responsibilities on enterprises as part of their basic corporate governance structures, states have been willing to develop, at the
19.

20.

Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to
Human Rights, University of Minnesota (Aug. 13, 2003), http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/
business/norms-Aug2003.html.
Discussed in Larry Catá Backer, Moving Forward The U.N. Guiding Principles For Business
And Human Rights: Between Enterprise Social Norm, State Domestic Legal Orders, and the
Treaty Law that Might Bind them All, 38 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 457 (2015).
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international level, a number of facilities for the articulation of guidance for socially
responsible conduct. These efforts are palatable from the perspective of states and
enterprises because they are soft law—they do not produce legal obligations that
may be enforced. But for that reason, civil society and other actors, particularly from
developed states, have found these efforts wanting.
Two of these efforts have been particularly influential—the OECD Guidelines
and the UNGP. Both touch on related aspects of the societal responsibilities of enterprises beyond the obligation of relevant portions of the enterprise to obey the law
of the jurisdiction to which they may be subject. The OECD Guidelines and the
UNGP are premised on the assumption that enterprises engage in activities in territories governed by states that are well in control of their own territories. They assume a functioning government. But more than that, they assume a functioning
government that is deemed a legitimate member of the community of nations. It is
that premise, for example, that underlies the whole of the critical first pillar of the
UNGP that speaks to the state duty to protect human rights. That state duty to
protect human rights, along with the corporate responsibility to respect human
rights (as specified in the UNGP), serves as the touchstone for the operationalization
of the UNGP framework. The OECD Guidelines are recommendations addressed by
governments to MNEs operating in or from OECD states.21 “The Guidelines provide
voluntary principles and standards for responsible business conduct consistent with
applicable laws and internationally recognized standards.”22 The OECD Guidelines
extend “beyond the law in many cases.”23 They are supported by an implementation
mechanism overseen by states—the National Contact Point System24-to promote
and implement the OECD Guidelines. And since 2011 they have also incorporated
within their framework the substance of the UNGP.25 The OECD Guidelines are
grounded in high standards of business conduct.26
But what happens when the core premise of these systems of societal responsibility are undercut; that is, what happens when the state itself is unable to fully engage? That was the question central to the UN Expert Panel's report on illegal exploitation of natural resources in the Democratic Republic of Congo.27 The Panel

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
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OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 15, at 13.
Id.
Id. at 17.
Larry Catá Backer, Rights and Accountability in Development (Raid) vs Das Air and Global
Witness v. Afrimex – Small Steps Towards an Autonomous Transnational Legal System for the
Regulation of Multinational Corporations, 10 MELB. J. INT’L L. 258 (2009).
OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 15, at 3.
Id. at 14.
U.N. Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural
Resources and other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo, U.N. Doc. S/2002/1146
(Oct. 16, 2002), available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2002/1146.
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had been established by the United Nations in 2000 in response to reports of violations of international law in the course of the Second Congo War. It determined that
a large number of companies had not been observing the OECD Guidelines in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and argued that OECD states had failed in their
obligations to promote adherence to the OECD Guidelines among enterprises established within their territories.28 The issues raised by this expert panel bore fruit
within the frameworks of the UNGP and the OECD Guidelines. Each is discussed
in turn.
A. The UNGP Approach.
The UNGP adopted a two-prong approach to the issue of enterprise conduct in
conflict zones. That approach focused first on the state duty to protect human rights
(the first pillar of the protect-respect-remedy framework of the UNGP). It then elaborated a standard by which enterprises could assess the extent of their second pillar
responsibility to respect human rights. Together the UNGP establishes a regime in
which home states are expected to manage the behavior of enterprises over which
they assert a measure of control, including the enforcement of international norms
extraterritorially through their regulatory power.29 And enterprises are expected to
measure their own conduct against international standards for complicity in the
breaches of human rights by those operating in the territories in which they engage

28.

Discussed in Vuyelwa Kuuya, The Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of
Wealth in the Democratic Republic of Congo (2008), available at http://www.google.com
/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=4&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CDIQFjAD&url=http%3
A%2F%2Fbusiness-humanrights.org%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2Fmedia%2Fbhr%2Ffiles%2
FVuyelwa-Kuuya-on-UN-Expert-Panel-DRC-Nov-2008.doc&ei=lajSVLXYOsfFgwTdv4SIDA&usg
=AFQjCNEFN8ayx0BDnXB_eyS3I_wKF0RsZA&sig2=lOjkmme_Ra_BthNlGO25Zg&bvm=bv.851
42067,d.eXY.
The Report noted:
The Governments of the countries where the individuals, companies and financial
institutions that are systematically and actively involved in these activities are based should
assume their share of the responsibility. The Governments have the power to regulate and
sanction those individuals and entities. They could adapt their national legislation as needed
to effectively investigate and prosecute the illegal traffickers. In addition, the OECD
Guidelines offer a mechanism for bringing violations of them by business enterprises to the
attention of home Governments, that is, Governments of the countries where the enterprises
are registered. Governments with jurisdiction over these enterprises are complicit
themselves when they do not take remedial measures. U.N. Security Council, supra note 27,
at 31.

29.

Though the UNGPs are grounded in a more benign form of extraterritoriality it still appears to
encourage extraterritorial application of the domestic legal orders of developed states at the expense
of international norms applied by states within and without their borders. See Olivier DeSchutter,
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction as a Tool for the Human Rights Accountability of Transnational
Corporations, CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF LOUVAIN AND THE COLLEGE OF EUROPE (Dec. 22, 2006),
http://cridho.uclouvain.be/documents/Working.Papers/ExtraterrRep22.12.06.pdf.
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in economic activities.
The first pillar of the three pillar framework, the state duty to protect human
rights, forms the backbone of the UNGP framework. That is a legal duty but is
constrained by the willingness of states to adopt international human rights norms
and to transpose them into their domestic legal orders. As such the precise extent of
the state duty to protect human rights can vary widely from state to state. That
approach first focused on the obligation of home states in the context of their duty to
protect human rights (in this case through their regulatory power over enterprises).
That duty extends, within the logic of the UNGP, to a duty to manage, through law,
the behavior norms that ought to be followed by enterprises operating outside the
national territory of the home state and in conflict zones.30 UNGP Principle 7 sets
out the basic rule: “Because the risk of gross human rights abuses is heightened in
conflict-affected areas, States should help ensure that business enterprises operating in those contexts are not involved with such abuses.”31 The obligation applies not
merely to enterprise home states but also to states that are neighbors of the conflict
zone.32 It is important to recognize, though, that the state duty under Principle 7 is
limited to conflict zones. It does not extend to weak governance zones in the absence
of conflict. That limitation is significant.
Principle 7 then specifies the manner of compliance with that duty through a coordinated program of management based on identification, assistance, penalties and
regulatory constraints.33 First, the state may engage with enterprises at an early
stage to “identify, prevent and mitigate the human rights-related risks of their activities and business relationships.”34 This method seeks to develop coherence between the state duty to protect and the implementation of the corporate responsibility to respect human rights in a way that is managed by the home state, rather than
30.

31.
32.
33.

UNGP, supra note 7, § 7, at 8-9. The Commentary makes this clear: “In conflict-affected areas,
the “host” State may be unable to protect human rights adequately due to a lack of effective
control. Where transnational corporations are involved, their “home” States therefore have roles
to play in assisting both those corporations and host States to ensure that businesses are not
involved with human rights abuse” Id. at 9, Commentary.
Id. § 7, at 8.
Id. at 9, Commentary (“provide important additional support”). The nature of that support is
not specified though it would likely be measured by reference to that neighboring state’s own
duty to protect human rights.
Id. The coordination is made explicit in the Commentary, which provides that:
home States should foster closer cooperation among their development assistance agencies,
foreign and trade ministries, and export finance institutions in their capitals and within
their embassies, as well as between these agencies and host Government actors; develop
early-warning indicators to alert government agencies and business enterprises to problems;
and attach appropriate consequences to any failure by enterprises to cooperate in these
contexts, including by denying or withdrawing existing public support or services, or where
that is not possible, denying their future provision.

34.
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Id. § 7(a), at 8.
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by either the enterprise or the host state. Second, the state should provide assistance to these enterprises “to assess and address the heightened risks of abuses,
paying special attention to both gender-based and sexual violence.”35 The state,
then, may manage responses in ways that contribute to the coordination of the state
duty to protect under its national legal regime, and the corporate responsibility to
respect under international norms. Third, where enterprises subject to home state
control are engaged in gross human rights abuses and refuses to cooperate, then the
state should help ensure that these enterprises be denied access to public support
and services.36 Fourth, and more generally, states should ensure “that their current
policies, legislation, regulations and enforcement measures are effective in addressing the risk of business involvement in gross human rights abuses.”37 This produces
an additional duty on states under the 1st pillar—a duty to “warn business enterprises of the heightened risk of being involved with gross abuses of human rights in
conflict-affected areas”38 The Commentary suggests that states review their domestic law to address these heightened risks—effectively inviting the extraterritorial
extension of national law to territories which the state has determined are experiencing a governance failure.39 Multilateral efforts are encouraged.40 And these obligations are considered additional to the state’s obligations under international humanitarian law in situations of armed conflicts and international criminal law, at
least to the extent these obligations are recognized by the state. The extraterritorial
implications ought to be troubling.41 Yet they appear necessary where, as here, the

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. § 7(b), at 9.
Id. § 7(c), at 9
Id. § 7(d), at 9.
Id. at 9, Commentary.
Id. “This may include exploring civil, administrative or criminal liability for enterprises
domiciled or operating in their territory and/or jurisdiction that commit or contribute to gross
human rights abuses.”
Id. But these ought to be undertaken in a way that furthers the objectives of the UNGP. See
Id., § 10, at 11-12.
Sara Seck notes one of the more troubling aspects of the new extraterritoriality, the increasing
pattern of developed states to build two sets of normative standards for multinational
corporations, one applicable within their jurisdiction and the other applicable to MNC activities
outside the state. See, Sara Seck, Emerging Market Multinational Home States, Extractive
Industries, and the Inside/Outside Problem, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (July 2, 2015),
available at http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/sara-seck-on-emerging-market.html. A
U.K. Parliamentary report noted:
Perhaps unsurprisingly, we received far more evidence on the operations of UK companies
abroad than about the human rights record of UK firms at home. The international debate
on the impact of globalization and the cross-border influence of companies on human rights
is more advanced than the discussion of corporate responsibility and human rights in the
UK.
Human Rights Joint Committee, Any of Our Business? Human Rights and the UK Private
Sector, 2009-10, H.L. 27, ¶ 72 (U.K.) available at, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/
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UNGP framework contemplates states as the vehicle for providing international law
governance in conflict territories. The troubling part occurs where states are inclined to export not just their sense of international law, but their own domestic
policies and laws as well.
The second pillar of the three-pillar framework of the UNGP, the responsibility of
enterprises to respect human rights exists independent of the enterprise obligation
to comply with the law of the locations to which its operations and governance structures may be subject. It is founded on the obligation to respect a basic set of international human rights.42 That responsibility to respect is operationalized through a
process of human rights due diligence,43 which requires the enterprise to develop
policies, implement them and then “to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for
how they address their adverse human rights impacts.”44 Large transnational civil
society actors remain skeptical of the promise of this approach and continue to push
for some sort of legal superstructure to impose national obligations on companies for
breach of transnational legal standards.45
It is in recognizing this autonomous and independent responsibility, sourced in a
specific set of international norms not directly imposed on enterprises, that the
UNGP extended the scope of responsibility beyond the orbit of the state and of national legal systems. The corporate responsibility to respect human rights in conflict
zones is founded on notions of context.46 Principle 23 provides that: “In all contexts,
business enterprises should: (a) Comply with all applicable laws and respect internationally recognized human rights, wherever they operate; (b) Seek ways to honor
the principles of internationally recognized human rights when faced with conflicting requirements; (c) Treat the risk of causing or contributing to gross human rights

42.
43.
44.
45.

pa/jt200910/jtselect/jtrights/5/507.htm.
The International Bill of Human Rights. UNGP, supra note 7, § 11, at 13.
UNGP, supra note 7, §§ 16-22, at 16-25.
Id. § 17 at 17-19.
Among these is the powerful and influential establishment NGO Amnesty International.
Although it is now widely accepted that corporations have a responsibility to respect human
rights, too many times profits are built on the back of human rights abuses. Despite laws in
many countries that allow companies to be prosecuted, governments rarely even investigate
corporate wrongdoing.
When communities’ attempt to get justice they are thwarted by ineffective legal systems, a
lack of access to information, corruption and powerful state-corporate alliances. Worryingly,
when the poor cannot secure justice, companies learn that they can exploit poverty without
consequences.
Corporate Accountability,
corporate-accountability/.
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abuses as a legal compliance issue wherever they operate.”47 The Commentary emphasizes that irrespective of the context in which they operate, all enterprises have
the same responsibility to respect human rights wherever they operate.48 What context changes is the nature of the response expected of companies as necessary to
fulfill their responsibility.
Some operating environments, such as conflict-affected areas, may
increase the risks of enterprises being complicit in gross human
rights abuses committed by other actors (security forces, for
example). Business enterprises should treat this risk as a legal
compliance issue, given the expanding web of potential corporate
legal liability arising from extraterritorial civil
claims, and from the incorporation of the provisions of the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court in jurisdictions that
provide for corporate criminal responsibility. In addition, corporate
directors, officers and employees may be subject to individual
liability for acts that amount to gross human rights abuses.49
Complicity is the touchstone for responsibility. That is, that the responsibility to respect human rights includes the obligation to avoid becoming embroiled in the violations of human rights norms directly applicable against states. In these contexts,
the enterprise is expected not to exacerbate the situation.50 “In assessing how best
to respond, they will often be well advised to draw on not only expertise and crossfunctional consultation within the enterprise, but also to consult externally with
credible, independent experts, including from Governments, civil society, national
human rights institutions and relevant multi-stakeholder initiatives.”51 The expertise derives from two principal sources. The first is the enterprises’ home states,
under the framework established in UNGP § 7. The second is through international
norms, which most importantly include those developed through the OECD, the
character of which is considered next.
B. The OECD Approach—The Risk Awareness Tool.
The UNGP provisions relating to conflict zones had not been written in a vacuum.
Indeed, that approach effectively supplemented an earlier and more extensive

47.
48.
49.
50.

51.

Id.
Id. at 25-26.
Id.
See UNGP, supra note 7, §17, at 19 (“As a legal matter, most national jurisdictions prohibit
complicity in the commission of a crime, and a number allow for criminal liability of business
enterprises in such cases.”). The Commentary emphasizes the dual nature of complicity, as a legal
concept and as a non-legal concept. In the later case, it signifies a societal understanding that the
corporation benefited informally from the bad acts of others.
Id. § 23, at 25-26.
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framework for the structuring of corporate responsibilities in weak governance
zones that were established through the OECD as a complement to its OECD Guidelines. In response to this report, the 2005 G8 Summit directed a request to the
OECD, for developing guidance for companies operating in weak governance zones,
which together with the UN Security Council's call on OECD members to promote
observance of the OECD Guidelines served as the impetus for the consideration of
the development of a set of additional guidance in the context of territories where
government was effectively absent. The result was the unveiling of an OECD Risk
Awareness Tool for Multinational Enterprises in Weak Governance Zones,52
adopted by the OECD Council on June 8th, 2006.
The Risk Awareness Tool aims to function as a complement to the principles of
behavior set forth in the OECD Guidelines as well as other OECD instruments.53 It
was targeted for use in those contexts in which there was not a market failure requiring regulation, but analogously, a governance institutional failure that may require additional responsibilities of enterprises operating within them.54 The definition of a “weak governance zone” is based on these core premises:
A weak governance zone is defined as an investment environment
in which governments are unable or unwilling to assume their
responsibilities. These “government failures” lead to broader
failures in political, economic and civic institutions that, in turn,
create the conditions for endemic violence, crime and corruption and
that block economic and social development.55
Note that the definition does not link the condition of weakness to states. The focus
is on any area where governance is weak, even within states in which governance is
strong in some, but not all of its territory. The definition draws on the work of the
Development Assistance Committee’s Fragile States Group. The definition of “fragile states” was premised on notions of limited state will or capacity to address their
citizen’s basic needs.56
The core premise of the Risk Awareness Tool is grounded in managing business

52.
53.

54.
55.

56.
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OECD RISK AWARENESS TOOL, supra note 14.
Id. at 11 (“Through its development of this Risk Awareness Tool, the OECD Investment Committee
seeks to help companies in weak governance zones face these dilemmas and risks by calling to their
attention to the guidance contained in OECD instruments and the findings of the broad-based
consultations the Committee has conducted on this issue.”).
See id. at 11-14.
Id. at 9 (noting the slight variation in definition in the Introduction, “‘Weak governance zones’ are
defined as investment environments in which governments cannot or will not assume their roles in
protecting rights (including property rights), providing basic public services (e.g. social programs,
infrastructure development, law enforcement and prudential surveillance) and ensuring that public
sector management is efficient and effective.” Id. at 11.).
Id. at 13 n.1.
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behavior in zones of heightened risk—businesses apply the same international principles wherever they operate, but exercise substantially more care and shoulder a
greater governance burden, when they operate in places in which the state apparatus may not exist.57 The Risk Awareness Tool itself is then framed as a set of
questions addressing risks and ethical dilemmas that companies are likely to face in
weak governance zones. The Tool proposes a list of questions that companies might
ask themselves when considering actual or prospective investments in weak governance zones. The questions cover the following topics:
I) Obeying the law and observing international instruments
II) Heightened managerial care
III) Political activities
IV) Knowing clients and business partners
V) Speaking out about wrongdoing58
VI) Business roles in weak governance societies – a broadened view
of self interest
Each of these question areas contains a set of questions and consideration that companies might consider in framing the behaviors in territories with weak public governance. The Risk Awareness Tool questions are also informed by a fairly detailed
set of definitions,59 discussion of some of which will be taken up in Part II. We consider each of the questions in turn.
1.Obeying the law and observing international instruments. This first question
sets the basic rule. In the absence of enforceable local standards, international hard
and soft law standards apply. That is these international standards apply to inform
the parameters under which an enterprise ought to measure its conduct in weak
governance zones.60 The Risk Awareness Tool defines “relevant international instruments”61 as those cited in the OECD Guidelines, and note that enterprises “will
need to evaluate their particular business situations in order to decide which instruments are relevant to their operations.”62 Indeed, the questions suggest the value of
enterprise use of and contribution to the development of these standards.63 It is important to note that, like the UNGP, the relevant international instruments include

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 12.
Id.
See generally id. at 35-42.
See id. at 15 (“Because legal systems and political dialogue in weak governance zones (almost by
definition) do not work well, international instruments that provide guidance on acceptable
behaviors are particularly useful in these contexts.”).
Id. at 39.
Id.
See id. at 15-16.
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both hard and soft law instruments; some have no legal effect. Moreover, it is possible that some of these instruments might neither have been ratified nor transposed
into the domestic legal orders of home or host states. In that sense, then, the standard for business conduct in weak governance zones are situated beyond the state
and without reference to their legal order. That referent affects not merely the
sources of “law” for determining business behavior in weak governance zones, it is
also relevant for determining the extent to which an “abuse” has occurred.64 The
enterprise is counseled to be sensitive to the need for stakeholder engagement as
well as the prudence of following a do no harm policy. Particular attention is paid to
the possibility of abuse in the context of enterprise security services,65 money laundering and corruption.66
2. Heightened managerial care. The Risk Awareness Tool draws a connection between heightened risks of abuse in weak governance zones and the need to operate
under a heightened managerial care standard “in order to ensure compliance with
legal obligations and observance of international standards.67 To operationalize this
heightened duty of care, the Risk Awareness Tool looks to embedding relevant laws
and international standards within the corporation’s culture and policies.68 Such
policies ought to be promoted by the Board of Directors, be well communicated and
ensure that front line employees are adequately trained. But like the OECD Guidelines and the UNGP, it also extends this heightened care duty and the culture embedding project, including the OECD Guidelines to all of the enterprise’s downstream supply chain partners, through encouragement, “where practicable.”69
Heightened care is important in establishing appropriate corporate governance
structures. It is also central “in putting in place the management systems and adequate internal company control that will allow it to manage the heightened risks of
operating in weak governance zones.”70 It also plays a role in reporting and disclosure systems.71
3. Political activities. The Risk Awareness Tool recognizes the need for political

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
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See id. at 35 (“Abuses” are defined as “acts that are excessive or improper when evaluated using
widely accepted international concepts and principles for business conduct (see Relevant
international instruments).”).
See id. at 16-17.
See id. at 17-18.
Id. at 21 (The areas subject to this heightened care duty include “information gathering, internal
procedures, relations with business partners. . . . and use of external legal, auditing and consulting
services.”).
See id. at 21-24; see also UNGP, supra note 7, §§ 16-22, at 16-25 (OECD mimics the requirements
for human rights due diligence under the UNGP).
OECD RISK AWARENESS TOOL, supra note 14, at 21.
Id. at 22.
See id. at 23.
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engagement in weak governance zones. It frames this question in terms of recognition of and separation between proper and improper involvement in political activities.72 Improper activities are those entered into with the objective of gaining an
improper advantage. And improper advantage appears to include efforts to secure
waivers and exceptions from generally applicable law.73 Transparency is understood
as a key feature of the legitimacy of political participation.74
Yet underlying these efforts is a greater one—the effort to reduce the company’s
exposure to and complicity in corruption.
Companies in weak governance zones often find it necessary to forge
political alliances with high level governmental and political figures
in order to protect . . . in effect companies, through their political
activities, create an informal system of investment protection that
compensates for the lack of rights-based protection of their rights.75
The Risk Awareness Tool offers application of the heightened care standard for
managing at risk situations in what they describe as conflict of interest situations—
corruption generally.76
4. Knowing clients and business partners. It is in the context of this question that
the Risk Awareness Tool and the UNGP most closely align. The object of this section
is to avoid complicity in the acts of business partners and others with which the
enterprise must deal. “In weak governance zones, companies face heightened risks
of entering into relationships with employees, clients or business partners that
might damage business reputations or give rise to violations of law or other
abuses.”77 Application of the heightened duty standard and reputational due diligence78 are suggested as means of reducing this risk.
5. Speaking out about wrongdoing. This question presents itself almost as the
converse of the question on political activities. Here the Risk Awareness Tool provides a positive form of political involvement—as a sort of civil society actor in a
context in which civil society may otherwise be absent.79 “Information about wrongdoing (including crimes and abuses such as human rights violations, private or public corruption) can be especially valuable in weak governance host countries, which

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 25.
Id.; id. at 26 (“What steps can the company take to refrain from seeking or accepting exemptions
not contemplated in the statutory or regulatory framework related to environmental, health, safety,
labor, taxation and financial incentives among other issues?”)
Id. at 26.
Id. at 25.
See id. at 26.
Id. at 27.
See id. at 27 nn. 2-3 (the reference here is made to the Guidelines on Reputational Due Diligence of
the International Association of Oil and Gas Producers and the OECD Guidelines).
See id. at 29.
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have few institutions (e.g., free press, well developed legal and auditing institutions,
active and free trade unions and civil society) that can collect and channel information.”80 In that context enterprises might best serve host states by sharing information about abuse with home and host state governments. The Risk Awareness
Tools concedes that such activity can be dangerous, and thus advises a careful
weighing of the “costs, benefits and risks of speaking out or sharing information.”81
There are a number of interesting tensions here. The first is the tension between
the need for silence and the possibility that silence may well constitute complicity.82
The second is that the weakness of the governance zone may displace the obligation
to disclose from the host to the home state. And the last is the importance of balancing the risk to the enterprise against the risk to its employees and other stakeholders.83 The Risk Awareness Tool references the facilities developed by the World
Bank and the U.S. government’s “Bribery Hotline.”84
6. Business roles in weak governance societies – a broadened view of self interest.
This last question is the most challenging; in it the Risk Awareness Tool seeks to
make the business case for the societal obligations of enterprises.85 And it is also the
one that remains the most contentious among the enterprises to whom it is directed.86 “Individual companies and the business sector as a whole might . . . find it
in their broad self interest—as important members of weak governance host societies—to help these societies get on the path of institutional reform.”87 Here again
there is a tension between the economic and societal responsibilities of enterprises,
as well as the tension between the obligations of enterprises to participate or not in
the political life of weak governance zones. And underlying this public, societal responsibility, is the idea advanced that it includes a role to “advocate for widely accepted good policy practices.”88

II. Consequences and Issues
Both the UNGP and the OECD Risk Awareness Tool standards do much to develop a framework within which enterprises may gauge, manage and structure their
activities in weak governance zones. But like other new set of standards, both raise
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a number of issues that have neither been resolved nor might they promote the intended effect. The more significant of these issues are raised here:
A. Coherence—Scope of Coverage.
One of the more important structural objectives of the UNGP is to enhance regulatory coherence, and where that is impossible, at least seek regulatory coordination.
It is not clear that these standards together contribute to those objectives. First, the
two standards do not cover the same ground. The UNGP are focused on conflict
zones. The OECD Risk Awareness Tool is focused on weak governance zones. They
both seek to reach the public sphere equivalent of market failures of the sort that
propelled the CSR movement nearly a generation ago—governance or institutional
failures at the state level. Yet they do not reach the same set of actors. Coordination
becomes more difficult in this context and implementation within an enterprise becomes more difficult (in terms of resources necessary to comply) where the standards
may apply jointly in some contexts but not in others. Beyond that, of course, the
difference may permit strategic behavior of the sort that the standards mean to discourage.
Second, the two approaches are distinct enough to raise a question of coherence
and coordination. The UNGP focus on state duties to extend the reach of their national power to conflict zones. That effectively suggests that within conflict zones
any number of states may project their national law on the backs of the enterprises
domiciled in their jurisdictions as well as all of those individuals and entities involved in that enterprise to the extent of their relationships. The resulting fracture
produces a strange mix of law in conflict zones, one where the laws of multiple jurisdictions may apply unevenly through the activities of enterprises. The UNGP focus
on corporate responsibility targets complicity. The Risk Awareness Tool, on the
other hand, focuses on risk to the enterprise.89 It also targets compliance with international norms in the context of weak governance zones and suggests a smaller
role for extraterritoriality concepts in regulation.90 On one hand, the Risk Aware-

89.
90.

See generally id. at 12.
The has been more sensitive to concerns of developing states on this score, though in the service of
internationalism rather than of preserving any sort of distinct sovereign dignity for fragile or
developing states. See, e.g., OECD, Investments in Weak Governance Zones: Summary of
Consultations (Sept. 2015), supra. 3 (“Home country and international organizations can play
important -- but only supporting -- roles in assisting weak governance host countries to get on the
path to reform.” Id., at 3). Civil society has sought a broader scope for extraterritoriality, grounded
in the power of developed states to export their domestic legal orders with the economic activities
of enterprises they might control. See, e.g., Comments in response to the UN Special Representative
of the Secretary General on Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises’ Guiding
Principles – Proposed Outline, AMNESTY INT’L 1, 16-17 (October 2010), https://www.amnesty.org/
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ness Tool is more explicit in promoting the autonomous public and societal responsibility of enterprises in these zones. On the other, the UNGP, standing alone, appears more concerned about derivative liability. Yet that raises questions. A complicity and legal compliance touchtone seems to be a cautious approach in light of
the overall framework of the corporate responsibility, which is grounded on risk assessment, prevention and mitigation.91 While the two approaches are not incompatible, their methodologies are distinct enough to raise issues of institutional costs. It
also raises the possibilities that application of the two methodologies might not, in
every circumstance, produce the same result in terms of corporate behavior.
In the face of the many voluntary structures that have been developed to help
guide states and economic actors in this context, one might well ask whether coherence and coordination are even relevant to the analysis.92 One easy answer is that
they are not relevant in any significant respect. The OECD suggests that these distinct approaches represent a recognition of the essential polycentricity of the governance framework within which global economic activity functions—between,
within and beyond states, and beyond the competence of any single actor to control
fully.93 The UNGP is itself built on the premise of a social license to operate that
may be autonomous of the state’s public power.94 Another intimates that the weakness of states is in itself not an inevitable indicator of weak governance, in part precisely because governance is now transnational and polycentric, and may be taken
up by others.95 Yet this last point makes a stronger case for coherence and coordination among those normative structures that mean to guide non state actors (and
manage the temptations of states contemplating projecting their authority into other
states). Governance processes do not need the state so much as they need modes of
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societal coordination that are either to be provided instrumentally—by conscious coordination among institutional actors—or in markets.96 Or, alternatively, competition among systems in the marketplace of governance may eventually sort things
out—either by displacing all but one system or, more likely, by merging them into
some sort of workable approach—derived from pragmatic implementation over time
rather than by the application of any sort of instrumental oversight. In the case of
the governance structures for projecting non state power within weak governance or
conflict zones, the answer to the coordination problem will depend on the way in
which enterprises embed CSR and business and human rights practices within their
operational structures for decision making and reporting and the way in which the
OECD’s NCP’s special instance jurisprudence evolves.97
B. Issues of Definition—What Are Weak Governance or Conflict
Zones and Who Decides?
The issue of application looms large under both standards. The UNGP define
“conflict zones” indirectly through references in their commentary (e.g., “conflict affected area”).98 The Risk Awareness Tool attempts a definition of “weak governance
zone” explicitly.99 That raises two issues. The first relates to the meaning of these
terms. The second relates to who is empowered to make the determination of what
qualifies either as a weak governance or conflict zone.
While conflict zone or conflict affected area appears on its face to be fairly straightforward, a closer analysis reveals some difficult issues. It is clear that war zones
come within the definition. It is also clear that territories touched by civil war,
broadly defined, also qualify. But there are substantial areas within states in which
there is not recognized conflict that might also come within the meaning of the term.
For example, a state like Mexico might be deemed to include “conflict zones”, defined
as those areas effectively controlled by narco-traffickers. At its limits, territories
deemed to be high crime zones—portions of Chicago or Detroit perhaps—might also
be included.100 But that might not reflect the intent of the drafters. The words,
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Börzel and Risse, supra note 95, 120-126 (speaking to what they reference as the shadow of
hierarchy in the absence of the state.
Cf. Ashley L. Santer, A Soft Law Mechanism for Corporate Responsibility: How the Updated OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises Promote Business for the Future, 43 GEO. WASH. INT'L L.
REV. 375 (2011).
UNGP, supra note 7, § 23, at 25-26.
See OECD RISK AWARENESS TOOL, supra note 14, at 42.
See, e.g., Adam Chandler, Chicago’s Problem With Gun Violence, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 29, 2015)
available
at
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2015/09/chicago-shooting-recordyear/408070/; Daniel Fisher, America’s Most Dangerous Cities; Detroit Can’t Shake No. 1 Spot,
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though, survive its drafters and states which seek to apply it, may not be bound by
any notion of legislative or original intention.
More interesting perhaps is the open-endedness of the Risk Awareness Tool definition of a “weak governance zone”. One of the two markers of such a zone is subject
to a fairly straightforward analysis grounded in data. It is presented as an objective
standard, derived from markers of development and stability—where governments
are unable to assume their role and responsibility in protecting rights. To a large
extent, those markers go to the incapacity of a government to deliver the choice of
data services and provide an institutional framework that is viewed as legitimate.
Those markers are themselves derived from standards developed through the
United Nations, by international financial institutions or by civil society actors.101
But the objectivity of this data driven standard also veils the ideological presumptions that underlie the choice of markers. The markers tend to enhance the project
of global socialization to a standard of behavior, and an expectation of material culture that reflects the views of these global institutions. This is not to suggest at all
that this sort of “ideal standard” embedded in the markers is bad. Not at all, but it
does suggest that states that might lag are now more open to legal colonization
through the importation of host state law through enterprises operating in their territories when such states are labeled weak. That possibility is exacerbated by the
second criterion for weak governance.
Just as a state may be labeled a weak governance zone when it lacks capacity, so
might be labeled a weak governance zone when its government is deemed unwilling
to assume its role and responsibility. By what standard does one measure unwillingness? “Unwillingness” is essentially a subjective standard. It permits the imposition of an assessment of weakness in governance where a state chooses a governance model that might not be compatible with some consensus standard or other.
Consider for example a state that chooses to order its internal affairs on the basis of
ancient custom and tradition incompatible with international political economic and
social notions. Moreover, it is not clear how much conflict, inability or unwillingness
is necessary to trigger the application of the definitions. Is a high crime rate enough?
Is it enough that a government fails to extend its reach enough to satisfy the taste
for government of the home states of enterprises seeking to enter into a territory?
That is hardly velar, but the potential for abuse is quite clear. What is also clear is
that the concept of weak governance and conflict zones permits a loss of sovereignty
in a peculiar way—such states remain sovereign in the sense that they remain distinct political entities, but they lose their sovereignty to the extent that the determi-
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nation of weak governance or conflict zones opens the door to intervention in domestic affairs either by other public actors—states and international organizations—or
by private actors. In theory this may be for the best—especially where the alternative increases human rights abuses against individuals. But solicitude comes with
a price-This last point serves as a gateway to a larger concern—who gets to make the
determination of weak or conflict status. Both the UNGP and the Risk Awareness
Tool are silent on this point. Both seem to suggest that the question is not worth
asking because the answer is well known. In the first instance, international organizations would likely rely on measures developed through international financial institutions. The World Bank’s “Worldwide Governance Indicators”, 102 for example,
looks to measures of (1) voice and accountability;103 (2) political stability and the
absence of violence;104 (3) government effectiveness;105 (4) regulatory quality;106 (5)
rule of law;107 and (6) control of corruption.108 These measures have been developed
by and through international communities. They reflect factors, and definitions of
factors, that are consonant with the world view and operations of the institution that
deploy them. They further an ideology that, in its own way, is a more powerful set
of techniques for harmonizing projections of regulatory power than any effort at the
practice of conventional extraterritoriality. The disciplinary character of these
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The World Bank Group, Worldwide Governance Indicators, available http://info.worldbank.org/
governance/wgi/index.aspx#home.
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by elites and private interests.” Id., at Control of Corruption, available
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/cc.pdf.
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measures can be discerned by the inclination to use the measures not merely to reveal but to rank, and to use ranking to pressure conformity to the principles on which
the measures are grounded.109 It is not hard to imagine the use of these indicators
and the power of rankings to establish baselines of legitimacy both in terms of government structure and its normative operations.110 Yet for the moment that disciplinary power is fractured. Like the OECD Risk Awareness Tool and the UNGPs,
no one institution or state “owns” weak or conflict zone standards.111 For institutions
like the World Bank, this is viewed as either inevitable or necessary. As a consequence their approach to standards construction appear meant to be complementary
to any number of other measures—and to the institutions whose ideologies of governance conformity they reflect.112 There is thus an element of polycentric anarchy—a marketplace of standards and the competing ideological agendas on the basis
of which they are framed—in the sense of emerging multiple measurement structures without a single ordering principle, in the construction and implementation of
these standards.
But whatever the source or techniques used, it is apparent that the government
of the state affected rarely makes that determination, and usually has even less
power to object. It might be possible to vest that determination on relevant regional
associations—for example the Organization of American States or the African Union, with respect to its own members. Ought it to be made by the governments of
the home states of enterprises seeking to engage in activities in these areas? That
is implied by the UNGP. But those implications might also produce an unwelcome
invitation to extend national law, through enterprises, to host states, to serve as a
substitute, within the areas controlled by the enterprise, of any remnant of host state
law or governance. Must the home states use international standards, perhaps like
those techniques developed by IFIs to make that determination? That may also be
implied by both UNGP and the OECD Risk Awareness Toolkit. The application of
international standards would appear, at first blush to eliminate the nationalist element of extraterritoriality. Yet if it is left to states, and especially developed states,
to apply those international standards, the possibility for misapplication remains
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substantial. Many states might be unable to resist the temptation to apply their
own national version of international law and to project that outward. For some,
especially in developing states, in whose territory such determinations are most
likely to be implemented, the functional effect of these regimes might begin to look
like the old colonial system.113 But rather than endure projections of power directly
through the application of military force, power projections are made through the
invocation of international soft law devices. And, indeed, the UNGP are written to
push enterprises into consultation with home state governments, and for home state
governments to project their own domestic legal orders (including hopefully some
measure of international norms transposed into national law) as the framework for
monitoring, assistance and sanctions.
C. Risk and Complicity.
If issues of coherence and identification focus on the constitution of states that
may be targeted for analysis and action under the UNGP and OECD standards, then
issues of complicity and risk focus on the triggers for actions by enterprises. One of
the most interesting aspects of the two standards touch on the anchors chosen by
each around which to order their governance framework. The two ordering concepts
are not the same. That alone produces coherence and coordination issues—the “language” of each is different enough that each might require different approaches to
implementing the sort of human rights due diligence at the heart of the UNGP.
Ironically, both were deemed necessary to incorporate the requirements developed
within their respective frameworks.
For the UNGP, the anchor is complicity. For the OECD Risk Awareness Tool, the
anchor is risk. For the UNGP, the foundation of enterprise action is legal; under the
Risk Awareness Tool the foundation is economics. Complicity points to the issue of
legal compliance—explicitly referenced in the UNGP. Risk points to the objectives
of enterprises understood in terms of gain and loss.114 They thus point in somewhat
different directions. For the Risk Awareness Tool, legal non-compliance (including
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presumably the risk of liability through application of complicity principles) is a subset of risk analysis.115 The emphasis is on the aggregate effect of choices on reputation and performance. For the UNGP, risk is a subset of compliance, including legal
compliance. Those might arise from out of the relationship contemplated by Principle 7 between the enterprise and its home state. Or it may arise autonomously from
out of the corporate responsibility to respect human rights by reference to the International Bill of Human Rights.
Yet both then produce limitations on their respective scope that might make them
less useful in practice. UNGP §17 does note, in its commentary to the general framework for human rights due diligence that complicity has both a legal and non-legal
meaning. It points to the societal consequences of business enterprises being “perceived as being ‘complicit’ in the acts of another party where, for example, they are
seen to benefit from an abuse committed by that party.”116 But it is not clear how
that societal complicity concept carries over to weak governance zones, where, indeed, the formative act of complicity is to fail to apply at least the core international
law standards to the enterprises’ behavior.
The risk approach avoids interdiction. It suggests the costs of decisions made in
the course of operation in weak governance zones speaks to consequences, but within
them legal complicity, or even societal complicity, form a subset of those factors that
might be considered. And it suggests the “business case” against making certain
decisions, in terms of the overall aggregate effect on performance, as that is usually
understood in a business context. But an enterprise may indeed engage in such
analysis and decide that the risk, including the legal risk, is worth the reward. And
where the legal risk can be contained—within a subsidiary or in a contractual relationship, then the overall risk to the enterprise as a whole may be reduced further
still. A complicity standard, on the other hand, is meant to impose limits on the
range of choices implied by risk analysis. And those limitations are based on public
law concerns—the public policy of state, especially as it reflects emerging international norms. Some have taken that analysis farther and suggested a duty on the
part of enterprises to circumvent the law of weak governance zone states where to
do so furthers the corporate responsibility to respect.117 But that, itself, could suggest both a broader view of complicity standards and a danger to enterprises, one
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bound up in legal rather than societal constraints. That framework will produce a
different approach to decision making, narrower and more formal, but also one with
its own dangers.
D. The Perils of the Heightened Managerial Care Standard.
The Risk Awareness Tool is grounded on its implementation by enterprises under
a “heightened managerial care standard.”118 It is described as a variant of the risk
management term “due care.”119 Yet the term also carries with it the echo of a legal
standard of “care” for determining the standard of compliance by directors with their
duties to the enterprise. Thus the Risk Awareness Tool may also carry with it the
possibility of affecting the way in which a legal standard applicable to director duty,
might be applied in a legal proceeding. Indeed, the focus of the heightened care obligation tracks the legal standard for duty of care applied under the corporate codes
of many U.S. States. This avenue of corporate governance has generated some interest among academic commentators.120 But it remains primarily an abstract discussion. On the other hand, the argument from contract may be more fruitful. Might
it be possible for a court to determine that the decision of an enterprise to conform
to the standards of the Risk Awareness Tool has the effect of imposing a higher legal
duty of care in line with the heightened care standard of the Risk Awareness Tool
itself? That legal duty might be derived from contract. It could not bind the enterprise where these contractual obligations contradict baseline corporate fiduciary obligations to the enterprise and its shareholders. But within that set of constraints, it
might bind the enterprise (though not its directors). Yet, even that possibility raises
another set of risks for the enterprise, one perhaps of similar magnitude to the risks
assessed relating to operation in weak governance zones.
E. Legitimate and Illegitimate Political Activities.
The Risk Awareness Tool devotes substantial attention to the issue of legitimate
and illegitimate political activity by enterprises in weak governance zones. Improper
involvement in political activity is subject to an objective and a subjective test. The
former focuses on the host and home states, the latter on sensibilities beyond the
host states (with effects on conduct within the host state). The objective test is a

118.
119.
120.

obstruct adherence to the ‘Respect’ framework (by restricting public meetings, or formation of trade
unions, for example), companies need to circumvent the law creatively.”); accord id. at 33-42.
See OECD RISK AWARENESS TOOL, supra note 14, at 36-37 (defining “heightened managerial care”).
Id.
See, e.g., Jena Martin, Business and Human Rights: What’s the Board Got to Do With It?, U. ILL. L.
REV. 959 (2003); Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, Is There an Emerging Fiduciary Duty to
Consider Human Rights?, 74 U.CIN.L.REV. 75 (2005). .

323

14 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 297 (2016)

simple illegality standard—the political activity is improper if it is illegal in either
home or host state.121 But that raises the problem of extraterritoriality indirectly.
If conduct is legal in the host state, may a home state affect host state legal norms
by enforcing an inconsistent home state legal standard through enterprises operating within the host state? If so, the interference with sovereignty originates in home
states, and the enterprise serves as an instrument of the projection of regulatory
power beyond the borders of the projecting state. That ought to be problematic. The
response, of course, is that this is necessary in those territories already suffering
from institutional failures. It appears that where governments are weak or collapsed, other states have a freer hand, through their enterprises, to export their
laws. This is especially problematic when such exporting is undertaken through
state owned enterprises, where the role of the state might be more direct, and the
conduct of the enterprise might be of more direct interest to the home state government. The second, subjective, test—whether the enterprise would feel comfortable if
their political activities were transparently reported in detail in the media. There
again, the referent is not the sensibilities of the host state, but rather the global
community. The standard furthers the objectives of harmonization of notions of legitimacy as an international matter. But it does so without much participation by
the sovereign rights holders of the jurisdiction in which its effects will be most felt.
From the perspective of functional effect—the primary driver of the Risk Awareness
Tool—the result is net positive; from the perspective of theory and democratic principle, the result is at best mixed.
Similar issues arise in the context of the definition of legitimate political activities
of enterprises122 in at least one respect. The Risk Awareness Tool defines legitimate
political activity in part by reference to its purpose. That purpose is defined as the
promotion of “better participatory processes and a competitive market environment.”123 That purpose is then complemented by a number of additional requirements: good faith, transparency, and working partnership with indigenous individuals and organizations.124 For states whose political systems, and cultural tastes do
not run to those of advanced western democracies this invitation to political participation may smack of interference, and not just interference but as an invitation to
dismantle system in favor of something else. On the other hand, IFIs have long been
criticized for these efforts as well through their loan and technical assistance work.
The definition, of course, may be inevitable given the thrust of the Risk Awareness
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Tool’s emphasis on the societal obligations of enterprises.125 Yet that may also be
the problem. If foreign enterprises are encouraged to participate in the political processes of host states, or to direct their local operation’s participation in host state
politics, and they are encouraged to do this for their self-interest, it might be as likely
that this activity will weaken rather than strengthen local governance. It certainly
runs the risk of shifting the locus of power from popular centers and local elites, to
the enterprises that may seek to inject themselves in local politics, even if they do
this through local association. The Risk Awareness Tool candidly explains that a
segment of the business community consulted strongly opposed political involvement for fear that it would be difficult to police the legitimate-illegitimate divide.126
But it errs on the side of participation—and perhaps not unreasonably in light of the
strong premise of societal purpose in both the OECD Guidelines and the UNGP. But
policing that divide will prove to be a problem, and the demarcation of that divide
remains problematic even in advance industrial states.127
F. The Projection of the Ideology of BITs into the Private Sphere.
The move toward an internationalized institutionalization of enterprise responsibility in weak governance and conflict zones has not occurred in a vacuum. Beyond
its intimate connection with the development of normative and administrative structures for CSR regimens in public and private sectors, weak governance zones rules
reflect, in part, and must be understood within, developments in the consensus
structuring of trade and investment regimes among states, especially those articulated in bilateral investment treaties (BITs). The convergence is to some extent conscious. The United States, for example, has declared that its BIT program have as
their core objectives to “[p]rotect investment abroad; [e]ncourage the adoption of
market-oriented domestic policies that treat private investment in an open, transparent, and non-discriminatory way; and [s]upport the development of international
law standards consistent with these objectives.”128
Those objectives point to an important development in the ideology of international trade that is increasingly embedded in the international legal framework
within which cross border investment is structured. The ideology increasingly looks
to the internationalization of domestic law and its application as such in determining disputes between investors and states. The idea is that the BIT itself effectively
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internationalizes domestic law, in the sense that domestic law assimilated international law into its framework as general principles of law and because by their character these BITs pulled its subject matter out of a purely domestic legal context.129
Where that view has been rejected, an alternative basis of internationalization is
put forth—that though domestic law may be applicable, only that part of domestic
law not in conflict with principles of international law would be applied.130 Though
the specifics of BIT dispute resolution processes have advanced substantially since
the 1980s, the ideological framework, overlaying domestic law with the constraints
of international law and its principles, remains.
That ideological line—internationalizing obligations within a domestic legal order
appear as well in the context of corporate responsibility in weak governance or conflict zones. The consequences can be significant. If the foundational ideology of BITs
embraces notions of legal internationalization with respect to business conduct
touching on investment, then it is possible that this approach can be applied as well
to the private conduct of business in weak governance or conflict zones. Indeed, enterprises might be safer applying the domestic law of such zones only to the extent
of its conformity to general principles of international law in order to conform their
behavior generally to expectations of business conduct. In effect, what BIT culture
with respect to internationalization may accomplish is to amplify and manage the
approach of enterprises in selecting the nature and form of its responsibility in weak
governance and conflict zones. That internationalization, though may also work
against those with an expansive notion of the sort of international law that enterprises ought to apply in those zones. Specifically, a narrow reading of legal internationalization may preclude the effective implementation of the UNGP or the OECD
Guidelines precisely because they are not international law. On the other hand,
their acceptance within the business community may suggest that as a matter of
international practice some of UNGP or the OECD Guidelines compliance may be a
necessary component of determining the form in which domestic law would have to
be applied by the enterprise in such zones.
What clearly emerges, however, is that even a narrow reading of the enterprise
obligations in weak governance or conflict zones under these standards likely takes
as its starting point the ideological approach of BITs and its expectations of legal
internationalization. That will mean that whatever normative framework is applied, the domestic legal order of states in weak governance or conflict zones may
not be unquestioningly applied as written or as traditionally implemented. Rather,
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enterprises will have to carefully choose how to approach such domestic legal orderings in light of emerging international law principles sand standards including those
of the OECD Guidelines and the UNGP. That appeared to be the position taken in
2006 by the business sector. In a paper prepared by the International Organisation
of Employers (IOE), in collaboration with the International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC) and the Business and Industry Advisory Committee (BIAC) to the OECD,131
the legal internationalization was taken as a matter of course.132
Within this embedding of the cultures of BITs within weak governance and conflict zone responsibility regimes, then, has another important consequence. It moves
us toward the last significant issue implicated in their construction—the role of the
lawyer (governmental lawyers, in house counsel or counsel for NGOs, for example)—
in the enforcement of these emerging governance frameworks. That is the subject
taken up next.
G. Enforcement and the Role of Lawyers.
Enforcement of legal norms within the domestic legal orders of the states responsible for their implementation tends to be straightforward. Traditionally that relationship between the state, judicial or administrative authority, and law served as
the boundaries of enterprise activity of interest to lawyers. But the rise of soft law
systems at the international level has added a level of complexity, as well as ambiguity to the issue of enforcement, and consequently to the nature of the lawyer’s role
in advising the enterprise that faces choices under these governance frameworks.
The UNGP and OCED systems provide an excellent example of both, as well as the
traps that now face both enterprises and lawyers within regimes that are not formally legal but function like law in some respects.
The UNGP are not directly enforceable in the conventional sense.133 They are, as
their name suggests, guiding principles directed to states and enterprises. They are
meant to provide a framework within which states might better undertake their duties under national and international law (and norms to the extent that states might
be convinced to give them legal effect) as a basis for approaching policy choices.
States are encouraged to sharpen their compliance by creating and implementing
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“national action plans,” though these, like the UNGP themselves, have no legal effect in and of themselves.134 In a similar way they provide a framework within which
enterprises understand the scope of the societal norms that may assert an effect on
their operations—not as “law” but as the consequences of failing to meet the expectations of enterprises’ stakeholders. This so-called business case for the UNGP,135
is grounded in firm economics and self-interest. Societal norms shape the environment in which enterprises may maximize their welfare. Breaches of these societal
norms will consequently increase risk of reducing income or the viability of activity.
When such reductions are severe enough they might lead to liability, usually for
breaches of duty.
For the lawyer, this means an emphasis on risk and compliance auditing. Human
rights due diligence generally provides a useful framework for such compliance and
risk auditing. While the risks could be legal at the outer boundaries, the societal
nature of the UNGP “responsibility to respect” principles speak more to business
risk. The basis for that risk, though, is normative and framed by the UNGP. It also
means an additional emphasis on counseling for the conceptualization and implementation of internal corporate governance and operational rules—employee codes,
supplier codes of conduct, compliance with their party norms (sourcing and vendor
payments), and the like. This internal law of the enterprises is as much an issue of
policy for the enterprise as it is a matter of “lawmaking” understood in its functional
and contractual (private law) sense.136 The private law of the enterprise produces a
transnational code effective within the enterprise and its supply chain, one that interacts with a large and varied set of national law over parts of its operation.137
Where the “business case” for the UNGP is embraced, then its “soft law” character
can become hard via the governance contract system that constitutes corporate
transnational self-government. But that also requires the lawyer to counsel the enterprise seeking to harmonize the law of its internal operations respecting those instances in which rule consolidation is warranted and those situations in which it
does not—and to some extent the object of the UNGP seeks to inform the enterprise
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(and its lawyers) in making these decisions.138 Where the enterprise operates in a
conflict zone, the internal law of the enterprise may be the only effective governance
system applicable on the ground.
Like the UNGP, the OECD Guidelines and its complementary Risk Awareness
Tool, is not directly enforceable.139 This framework applies to the UNGP, as it has
been incorporated into the OECD Guidelines.140 To that extent, they are of interest
to the lawyer in the way the UNGP are—risk and compliance will tend to dictate the
scope and extent of an embrace of the guidelines within the enterprises’ culture and
written into its internal law (by lawyers mostly). But unlike the UNGP, the OECD
Guidelines does include an implementation procedure.141 The OECD Guidelines
provide for the establishment of National Contact Points (NCP) within OECD Member State governments, “undertaking promotional activities, handling enquiries and
contributing to the resolution of issues that arise relating to the implementation of
the Guidelines in specific instances, taking account of the attached procedural guidance.”142 Most of the activities of the NCPs are of small interest to the enterprise
and its lawyers, except one—the authority to contribute to the resolution of disputes
arising when an actor brings a claim to the NCP that an enterprise has failed to
comply with its obligations under the OECD Guidelines. Though these actions have
no formal legal or binding effect, because they function like a fact-finding determination that might have business risk implications, these proceedings become of interest to lawyers. And they have become of greater interest to global civil society
actors who view specific interest claims as a means of forcing functional compliance
outside of national law but effected through an organ of national government. For
most NCP jurisdictions, the extent of involvement in these specific instances is limited to sometimes quite anemic efforts to mediate disputes. Failure of mediation
ends their involvement. For a few jurisdictions, these disputes might lead to written
recommendations and quasi-judicial fact-finding. But even the threat of a specific
instance may pose risk to a company, risks which have produced efforts to settle
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these specific instances before these proceedings become public or fester.143 This becomes an important element of the risk calculus of lawyers especially in conflict zones
(UNGP) or in weak governance zones, with respect to which civil society actors may
have a greater incentive to bring claims (because of the absence of a state).
But these considerations do not end the analysis of “soft” enforcement. Increasingly, regional human rights organs have begun to incorporate the OECD Guidelines and the UNGP within the body of international law that they oversee. Enterprises may see their operations subject to review by regional human rights
organizations seeking compliance with the OECD Guidelines and the UNGP. In the
context of allegations of gross human rights abuses these instruments may play a
greater role where operations are undertaken in weak governance zones or conflict
areas. Thus, for example, the African Court for Human and Peoples’ Rights is empowered to apply relevant African and international instruments.144 The InterAmerican Commission for Human Rights individuals may petition determining the
human rights responsibilities of OAS Member States that allege violations of the
human rights guaranteed in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man (“the American Declaration”), the American Convention on Human Rights
(“the American Convention”), and other inter-American human rights treaties. Enterprise complicity may be part of that petition or may be used as evidence. In either
case the enterprise may be involved in a proceeding that may raise its rise and potentially its compliance exposure. Taken together, what is beginning to emerge is a
picture in which the hard law-soft law divide has become increasingly irrelevant
either to determine enterprise risk, or the role of lawyers in counseling enterprises
for “legal” compliance. Where the enterprise operates in weak governance or conflict
zones, the exposure grows, and the avenues for functionally effective enforcement.
Yet as a consequence, the gaps, conflict and tensions within the Risk Awareness Tool
and UNGP weak or conflict zone standards, some of which have been noted in this
section, become more important to the development of a coherent regulatory response to the issues posed in weak or conflict zones.
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III.Conclusion.
The management of economic activity now increasingly seamlessly organized as
functionally differentiated global systems within and among an architecture of domestic legal orders and international public and private normative orderings of differing legitimacy and authority has created an environment of governance complexity145 whose parameters are only recently being addressed as the processes of CSR
governance have helped “constitute the objects which come to be governed.”146 Complexity assumes a specific character when enterprises operate in territories in which
the institutions of the state are weak or where there may be conflict, they face unique
challenges. Over the last decade two international organizations have sought to
provide some basis guide corporations in determining how they should conduct their
activities in that context. Here, both frameworks were explored. Also explored were
the ways that CSR has been transformed, in some respects, from to a mandate for
assuming governance responsibilities in those states unable or unwilling to institute
systems of law that conform to international consensus standards on human rights
into something new, and explored a number of issues that have neither been resolved nor might they promote the intended effect.
Both the UNGP and the Risk Awareness Tool have significantly advanced the
framework within which enterprises can understand and mold their behaviors in
territories in which there are failures of government. The UNGP relies heavily on
the state as a principal means of disciplining home state enterprises, and through
them their supply chain relations. International law and norms are advanced
through state management of enterprise extraterritorial operation in conflict zones,
and through legal compliance programs focusing on international standards. The
Risk Awareness Tool more heavily focuses on the enterprise as the bearer of international law and norms within weak governance zone. Though it, too, would have
the enterprise look to its home state for guidance in the absence of rule of law frameworks in the zones in which they operate. Both approaches are thus grounded on the
superiority of international norms, irrespective of their character as law within the
domestic legal orders of states, but in distinct ways. Both acknowledge the autonomy
of enterprises as directly responsible for the operationalization of international
norms wherever they operate. Yet both also open the door to extraterritorial application of law. The same framework that advances the governance autonomy of enterprises also envisions them as the vehicles through which home states may project
145.

146.

See Bob Jessop, The Governance of Complexity and the complexity of Governance: Preliminary
Remarks on Some Problems and Limits of Economic Guidance, in BEYOND MARKET AND
HIERARCHY: INTERACTIVE GOVERNANCE AND SOCIAL COMPLEXITY 95 (Ash Amin & Jerzy Hausner
eds., 1997).
Id. at 124 (“these objects do not fully pre-exist the process of governance”).
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national power within host states with weak governance regimes. And this tension
built into both frameworks, a tension that goes to the dual character of enterprises
as both autonomous governance actors and as creatures of the states in which they
are domiciled, marks the potential and the challenge to the internationalization of
regimes of CSR.
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